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Freedom of Expression in the Public Schools
Petitioners, following a plan formulated by their parents and other stu-
dents, wore black armbands to school in protest against the war in Viet-
nam. Several days earlier, the school board had adopted a policy' provid-
ing that any student wearing an armband in school would be asked to
remove it, and upon failing to do so, would be suspended from school
until he returned without it. As a result of this policy, the petitioners
were suspended from school. A federal district court dismissed a com-
plaint' in which petitioners sought nominal damages and injunctive relief.'
The court found that the action of the school authorities was constitu-
tional, being reasonable to prevent disruption of the school's function. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed without opinion.' The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Held, reversed: An ex-
pression of opinion by students in public school which does not materially
and substantially interfere with appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school is entitled to the protection of free speech afforded by the first
amendment, and may not be prohibited by public school officials because
of an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
I. THE POWER OF SCHOOL AUTHORITIES To REGULATE STUDENT
CONDUCT
Historically, judicial review of the regulatory and disciplinary acts of
school authorities has been limited to a determination of whether the of-
ficials have exceeded their authority or have abused their discretion.!
School regulations have been upheld on the mere finding that a rational
basis existed for their adoption.7 Likewise, the legitimate authority of
school officials has been held to encompass the discipline of students and
the limitation of their activities in the interest of maintaining the "single-
ness of purpose" of running a school.' Under this "abuse of discretion"
test, the courts have upheld regulations prohibiting membership in school
fraternities,9 the wearing of cosmetics," the wearing of long hair by male
'The Court refers to the banning of the armbands both as a policy and as a regulation. The
term policy is probably the more appropriate of the two in that the prohibition was directed toward
a specific program of protest (i.e., the wearing of armbands in connection with the Vietnam protest).
'The complaint was filed by petitioners, through their fathers, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
'Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
'Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
s Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
6Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923); Leonard v. School Comm. of
Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965). Both cases concerned dress regulations, holding
that review by the court is limited in view of the school board's broad discretionary powers and that
the court will not pass on the wisdom or desirability of a school regulation, but merely on whether
the board has exceeded its authority.
7 Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967).
' Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
9 Id.
'
5 Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
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students," the wearing of "freedom buttons,"" and the participation by
married students in extracurricular activities."
Restrictions of this type have been based on two premises. The first is
the obvious necessity of maintaining order in the school. 4 The second is the
concept that school attendance is not a right, but a privilege, and that
compliance with rules and regulations established by school authorities is
a condition of attendance. 1"
Public school pupils have been acknowledged to retain their constitu-
tional rights while in school." Nevertheless, most cases have not dealt with
the conflict between the constitutional rights of public school students
and the authority of school officials to maintain discipline. With the ex-
ception of several recent cases,' this is particularly true with respect to
the right of free speech or free expression guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. The extent to which students in public schools are protected in the
exercise of their right to free expression cannot be determined without
considering the power of a state to protect valid governmental interests.
There can be no valid governmental interest in the suppression of free
expression itself. However, this does not mean that free expression cannot
be curtailed in the course of protecting an otherwise valid governmental
interest. The United States Supreme Court has held that when speech and
nonspeech elements are combined in one course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest affected by the nonspeech element can
justify regulation of the speech element of the same activity."
It is evident that there is a valid governmental interest in operating a
school and in maintaining appropriate discipline therein. However, in order
to curtail conduct which contains speech as well as nonspeech elements,
it apparently must be shown that the governmental interest cannot be pro-
tected unless the activity is curtailed. This apparent standard often has
been applied in cases involving picketing 9 and other forms of conduct con-
taining both speech and nonspeech elements. " When "pure" speech is in-
volved, however, the limits of permissible regulatory power are more nar-
row and the danger to the governmental interest must be more apparent
than when speech and nonspeech elements combine."
" Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
12Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
"Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967).
14 Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915); Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392
F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1966).
"Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
1" West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
" Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.
1966).
is United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
19Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490 (1949); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
"United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
" Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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The test of a regulation curtailing the constitutional rights of public
school students is one of balancing the authority of the school officials to
maintain order and discipline, and the constitutional rights of the stu-
dents. If the exercise of an individual's constitutional rights materially and
substantially disrupts the operation of the school, the exercise may be
validly regulated or curtailed by school authorities.' Burnside v. Byars
2 3
and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 2 two cases de-
cided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the same day, ap-
plied this "material and substantial disruption" test. Both cases involved
the right of public school students to wear "freedom buttons" in school.
That right was upheld in Burnside but was denied in Blackwell. The op-
posite holdings were the result of different degrees of disruption. In Burn-
side there was no evidence of disruption of school activities or harassment
of other students. However, in Blackwell the students who wore the but-
tons harassed those who did not and tried to force others to wear the
buttons. In upholding the right to wear the buttons, the court, in Burn-
side held that school officials may not infringe on students' rights of free
expression unless the exercise of those rights materially and substantially in-
terferes with the discipline required in operating the school."
II. TINKER v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT
In Tinker' the Supreme Court held that an expression of opinion by
public school students which does not materially and substantially interfere
with appropriate discipline in the operation of the school is protected by
the first amendment and may not be prohibited by school officials because
of an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. In so holding
the Court did not establish any radically different rules regarding the
rights of students, but rather, applied pre-established constitutional doc-
trine to the immediate fact situation. The Court reaffirmed the principle
that students retain their constitutional rights while in school. The wear-
ing of armbands was found to be "symbolic speech," entitled to first
amendment protection. Although the Court did find that the armbands
would cause controversy, it did not find that the activity in this instance
2Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). The disruption test has been applied often in the past, al-
though it has not always been expressly applied. In some cases applying the "abuse of discretion"
test (see note 6 supra, and accompanying text) the power of school officials to prevent disruption
has been presumed to be a part of their discretionary powers. Most of the earlier cases dealt with
matters of dress which were not considered in a free expression context, or at least not to the
degree the wearing of armbands was considered as free expression in Tinker. Tinker v. Des Moines
Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969); Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250
S.W. 538 (1923); Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
22 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
24 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
2 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966), cited in Tinker at 393 U.S. at 505.
One type of disruption which has been held to be within the scope of regulation is that not created
by the acts of the students being regulated but rather, disruption caused by other students hostile
to them. In this respect, see Justice Tuttle's dissenting opinion in Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist.,
392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), in which he states that the offending students should be restrained,
not those students who are exercising their rights. Although this case involved personal appearance,
the opinion is equally applicable to cases involving conduct in a purely expressionary sense.2 6 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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was of such a disruptive nature, interfering with the work of the school
or with the interest of the other students in being left alone, as to justify
curtailment." The Court noted that fear of controversy was the prime
motivating factor behind the school board's action in prohibiting the
armbands. This factor was not considered to be a valid basis for estab-
lishing the policy. The Court stated that the risk of controversy is an
inherent part of the right of free speech,"8 and found that mere contro-
versy does not conflict with the purpose of education. Indeed, the Court
stated that one of the integral 'parts of school attendance is personal inter-
communication between the students,' and that controversy is part of
the process of education. The Court held that intercommunication is not
limited to a particular place within the school, except as is necessary for
maintaining proper discipline. However, the Court did affirm the principle
that expression materially disrupting classwork, creating disorder, or in-
vading the rights of other students, may legitimately be curtailed.'0
The Court did not set forth any clear guidelines with respect to the
extent to which school authorities may take action to prevent disruption.
Although the Court has made it clear that physical disruption of school
activities may be prohibited, and that action may be taken to prevent such
disruption, it merely held that an undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disorder will not justify such a prohibition. Moreover, the Court did
not define "undifferentiated fear or apprehension." This standard creates
a problem which is illustrated by the Burnside and Blackwell cases, both
of which were cited by the Court. In these cases, the actions of the school
officials were very similar before the buttons were worn. The distinction,
if any, was that in Blackwell there had been some small disorder before
the prohibition took effect. Nonetheless, the prohibitions by the school
officials involved in those cases were upheld and overruled, respectively,
on the basis of what took place after the students violated the prohibition.
The result was that two prohibitions, seemingly alike on their faces, and
promulgated by similar fears on the part of school authorities were later
reviewed apparently in light of what actually developed, instead of in
terms of what might reasonably have been expected to happen, a result
the Court seems to approve in the instant case. Although the Court found
in Tinker that the school board had no reason to anticipate substantial
disruption and prohibited the armbands in an attempt to avoid contro-
versy, it did not set forth a clear standard by which to measure the valid-
ity of prohibitory measures."
"" The Court seemed to be influenced in its decision by the fact that the particular act of
wearing armbands had been singled out for prohibition. The Court noted that other forms of
political expression, such as political buttons worn during national political campaigns, had not
previously been prohibited.
"
5The Court cited Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), which held that free speech
serves its best and highest purpose when it causes controversy, and even anger.2 Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
"°See Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v.
Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
" In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that he could not share the Court's
assumption that children's first amendment rights are co-extensive with those of adults. 393 U.S.
503, 515. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Black felt that diverting the minds of school students
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